Voip Honeypot Architecture by Nassar, Mohamed et al.
HAL Id: inria-00149554
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00149554
Submitted on 26 May 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Voip Honeypot Architecture
Mohamed Nassar, Radu State, Olivier Festor
To cite this version:
Mohamed Nassar, Radu State, Olivier Festor. Voip Honeypot Architecture. IM 2007 - Moving from
Bits to Business Value, IFIP/IEEE, May 2007, Munich, Germany. pp.109-118. ￿inria-00149554￿
VoIP Honeypot Architecture
Mohamed Nassar, Radu State, Olivier Festor
LORIA - INRIA Lorraine
615, rue du jardin botanique,
54602 Villers-Lès-Nancy, France
Email: nassar, state, festor@loria.fr
Abstract— Voice Over IP (VoIP) or telephony services over
Internet announces a new revolution in the telecommunication
world for its management simplicity and cost reduction. VoIP
security extends the existent risk range of IP protocols and
infrastructures and introduces new attacks as well. Threats
identification and standardization, secure signaling and media
architectures, as well as intrusion detection and prevention mech-
anisms are currently under debate in the research community.
We propose in this article a SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)
specific honeypot. We describe its design and implementation.
We detail the inference mechanism which classifies the received
messages. We show how the model investigates about a received
call and raises an appropriate conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even if VoIP attacks are not in the headline news in
security reviews yet they soon will be of major harmfulness
for the Internet telephony services. We witness more and
more cases like eavesdropping which harms the customers
privacy, or fraudulent usage which impacts enterprises budget.
Some of the attacks are inherited from the vulnerabilities of
data networks over which the VoIP stack is operating. Others
are possible because of the high performance and quality of
service required by the application. Securing VoIP introduces
new challenges in security management, and demands specific
defense components such as firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, and honeypots.
”A honeypot consists of an environment where vulnerabil-
ities have been deliberately introduced in order to observe
attacks and intrusions” [1]. This defense strategy is very
successful even if sometimes it can be dangerous. We propose
in this paper a phone playing such role. We aim in the first
place to record the intruders activities, and understand their
methodologies in order to enhance our protection systems.
In the next section, we go through an overview of the VoIP
threats. We debate about the research challenges of the VoIP
security in section III. Functional aspects of our honeyphone
to record and study attack traces is depicted in section IV.
In section V we describe the honeyphone architecture. The
honeyphone agent which is the core of this architecture is
described in section VI. Section VII is an overview of the
inference engine with an example of unrolling. We mention
the related works in section VIII and we conclude the article
in section X.
II. VOIP THREATS
The most important attacks that have started to be reported
in the VoIP community are summarized below. Some attacks
explore the target domain and promote other attacks. We refer
the reader who is looking for a complete taxonomy to [2].
A. Service disruption
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to affect the availability
of the service application. According to the employed strategy,
they are of different types:
• exploiting vulnerabilities in the VoIP stack of a server
and take it down using malformed packets;
• flooding the available bandwidth of a server by a dis-
tributed attack where several botnets are used in amplifi-
cation;
• flooding the server with a large amount of requests with
different Call-Ids and without completing the three
steps handshaking. The server capacities (memory and
CPU) will be overloaded;
• CANCEL and BYE SIP specific attacks might take place
against the SIP call establishment procedure. If someone
tries to call Bob, and Trudy sends a CANCEL to Bob,
then Bob will be prevented from receiving calls. If Bob
tries to make a call, and Trudy sends a CANCEL to the
destination, then Bob will be prevented from making
calls. Otherwise, Trudy could send a BYE to terminate
a session after a few moments of its setup. Trudy could
use proxy responses such as 4xx(client error), 5xx(server
error) or 6xx(global error) to convince Bob that an error
situation is preventing him from making calls.
B. Call tracking
The interception of SIP INVITE packets provide sensitive
informations such as the source and the destination of the
call (To, From, Via headers). The SIP body may contain
Session Description Protocol (SDP) informations that allow
eavesdropping of unencrypted traffic or encrypted traffic is
the key negotiation was unencrypted.
C. Call hijacking
This kind of attack exploits the absence of authentication,
integrity and non repudiation mechanisms. Even if SIP uses
a strong authentication scheme similar to the HTTP digest,
some security gaps still exist. A SIP user agent, proxy, redirect
or registrar server might challenge a client user agent to
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authenticate. In addition, a user agent can challenge back a
proxy server to be sure that it also knows the shared secret.
Unfortunately, only the server authenticates the client in most
VoIP implementation and the following attack is possible: Bob
wants to call Alice. Bob’s phone sends an INVITE message
to the proxy server within its domain in order to route the call
towards Alice’s domain. Trudy impersonates the proxy and
redirects the call to its own IP address. To do so, Trudy has
to create a crafted SIP response and put its own IP address
in the Contact header. Bob’s phone does not require the
authentication of the proxy, so it accepts the response and
redirects the call to pass by Trudy’s machine.
Missing the end to end authentication is another common
case, and a man in the middle scenario is possible. A session
established between Bob and Alice could be hijacked by
Trudy. Indeed, Trudy who has intercepted the INVITE in
the beginning of the session, copies the Call-ID, To and
From tags to a new INVITE packet and increments the
sequence number CSeq. Trudy steps in and sends the crafted
INVITE to Bob or Alice. Since no authentication is required,
Trudy ends up by hijacking the session. She can change both
media and signaling characteristics, like for example changing
media ports, adding or deleting media streams, changing the
signaling path (Via headers) or denying signaling from any
side to its benefit (Contact header).
D. Password cracking and user enumerating
A brute force algorithm which tries to guess the correct
password of a SIP URI can be launched against registrars or
proxy servers. These attacks could be preceded by a scanning
for SIP devices and enumeration of existing user names. The
enumeration consists in requesting the location server with
a sequence of different destinations. Depending on the case
(if a destination exists and is registered, if it exists and is
not registered, or if it does not exist), then the response of
the location server is different. In such a way, the existing
addresses are filtered and input to the cracking component. The
attacker may also find the user names of a domain belonging
to an enterprise by exploring the home page of the enterprise
or by watching the SIP traffic exchanged in the domain.
E. SPAM over Internet telephony (SPIT)
The unsolicited SPAM messages that threaten users can
be amplified by a more annoying voice advertising. SPIT
scenarios include call centers (human employees), calling bots,
ringtone SPIT (playing the advertising audios as the phone is
ringing by use of the Alert-info header) and combinations
of them [3].
F. Host based intrusions
Media Gateway Controllers (MGCs) and voice mail servers
are critical points in the VoIP architectures. The MGCs are
responsible for bridging between different networks such
as between SIP based signaling (Internet) and ISUP based
signaling (PSTN). The translation between a SIP message
and an ISUP message consists of mapping the corresponding
parameters. Malicious management of this process is another
source of threat which is caused by the lack of authentication
and integrity mechanism in the SS7 network. A more com-
prehensive threat model of the integrated signaling between
VoIP and PSTN is found in [4]. Call Detail Records (CDRs)
and users confidential informations must be protected against
host intrusions and remote code execution as buffer overflow
attacks.
G. Media protocols related attacks
The suite of multimedia transport protocols such as Real
Time Protocol (RTP) and Real Time Control Protocol (RTCP)
are vulnerable to attack. A demonstrative tool of the RTP
play out attack was presented in [5]. Eavesdropping is about
capturing and reconstructing the media stream from the RTP
flow. While encryption prevents this, it can often be bypassed
in those cases where the key is negotiated in clear.
Another media related weakness is that SIP is out of band
and does not monitor and control automatically the media
traffic. Modifications of the QoS characteristics are possible
by means of media protocols and are not transparent to SIP
which harms a QoS-based tariffing approach.
H. Supporting protocols related attacks
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Domain Name
System (DNS) support the VoIP application. ARP manages
the data link layer in a local area network, particularly that of
an enterprise, while DNS offers translation services between
domain names and IP addresses. In ARP poisoning between
a phone and a server, the intruder tries to bind between its
physical address and the IP address of the server in the phone,
and on the other side, to bind between its physical address and
the IP address of the phone in the server. DNS poisoning is
very similar and consists on injecting falsified records in the
DNS server. MAC and IP spoofing are among fundamental
flaws in the Internet and have to be addressed from a global
view of security architecture.
I. Firewall traversal
VoIP requires a new generation of firewalls with dynamic
features to open and close media ports with respect to the
session negotiation parameters. Attacking the firewalls by DoS
or compromising them discloses the protected devices. One
way is to exhaust the firewall ressources by many requests for
port opening and closing. To traverse the firewall, malwares
using backdoors could takeover a media port and transfer any
kind of traffic over this channel.
J. Caller-ID spoofing
Caller-ID or Calling Number Delivery is a traditional tele-
phony service which allows the called Customer Premises
Equipment (CPE) to receive a calling party’s directory number.
Automatic Number Identification(ANI) is a system used by
telephone companies to determine the number of the calling
party. Traditionally, Caller-id / ANI spoofing was a com-
plicated process requiring access to the operator company’s
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Private Branch eXchange (PBX) or switches. With VoIP, it
is easy to spoof the caller identity (From SIP header) so
the callee will receive it as the number or the name of the
incoming call. Caller Identity spoofing promotes identity theft
and harms automated or human verification systems such as
voice mails.
K. Phishing attack
Phishing is about masquerading as a trustworthy third party
in an attempt to acquire confidential information from victims.
The phisher uses a link on an email as a lure, deceives
the victim by a web page seeming to be its bank home
page and asking him to fullfill some fields with sensitive
informations. In a VoIP phishing scam, the victims are sent
an official looking email asking them to call into the bank
at a mentionned DID (Direct Inward Dialing) number. The
victims click and call (or may call from the PSTN) and are
directed to an automated voice system requesting that they
enter account numbers and personal informations. The low-
cost and ease of VoIP service providing promise to see such
attacks in the future.
III. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
In front of this large vector of VoIP threats, the research
community is facing of multiple challenges. We focus on two
compromises that are essential in the security management
planning:
• Defense without complication: In most deployments, en-
cryption and authentication mechanisms are not incorpo-
rated because of the complexity of their application and
their use by the customers. However, when a customer
receives a call on his VoIP phone with the number of his
bank agency posted on the screen, he has to ensure that he
is talking to his bank adviser. What makes this challenge
more difficult is that the voice communications have left
the well centralized and secure switches and PBXs and
they are now in a new environment where:
– signaling and data are managed by independent
protocols;
– VoIP systems are distributed, heterogeneous and un-
der different autonomous administrations;
– Internet hackers and intruders have much experience
in exploiting the battleground;
• Defense without isolation: It is common that people
distribute personal cards, post personal addresses and
phone numbers and include these kind of data in direc-
tories. Reachability is a fundamental condition in social
and business lives which can be violated while dealing
with SPIT prevention. SPAM techniques could not be
simply imitated because SPIT calls are more annoying
and disturbing. Solutions that consist in blocking all the
callers who are not found in the address book are not
practical. Block the disturbing call after its occurrence is
not satisfying either. For these reasons, many researchers
claim that SPAM, SPIT and SPIM (SPAM over Instant
Messaging are basically sociological events and it is hard
to prevent them.
Inside our VoIP honeypot architecture, we propose a verifi-
cation scheme as a participation in the debate of the challenges
mentionned above.
IV. FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE HONEYPHONE
In this section, we motivate the need for a VoIP honeypot
by introducing functional scenarios where it can work and
bring realistic benefits. The honeyphone works in an enterprise
domain where multiple user agents are served by a VoIP PBX
or a SIP proxy. We built our own testbed with both Asterisk
PBX 1 and SIP Express Router (SER) 2 in place.
A Private Branch eXchange PBX is a device that is owned
by a private business and that connects office telephones with
the public telephone network. Users of a PBX share a certain
number of outside lines for making external telephone calls.
PBX is a term referring to the Public Switched Telephony
Network (PSTN) and not to VoIP/SIP architectures. However,
we have chosen the open source project Asterisk PBX which
is growing fast and replacing in many cases specific SIP
proxies and servers within Small Office/Home Office envi-
ronments (SOHO). Asterisk supports different VoIP protocols
(e.g. H323, IAX) as well as other telephony technologies (e.g.
ISDN, PSTN). In addition to PBX switching functionality,
Asterisk allows the use of various application services such as
Voicemail, file playback and directory listing. It has a codec
translator, a scheduler and an I/O manager. From the SIP point
of view, rather than being a gateway with other protocols and
standards, Asterisk is a SIP registrar, location server, and a
back to back user agent.
SER is a high performance and open source SIP server that
can be deployed in larger environments. As an advantage over
Asterisk, SER is able to handle a high number of users and
calls per second. SER can be a SIP proxy, registrar or redirect
server. It provides accounting, monitoring and security services
in addition to a user provisioning web interface. In many
deployments, SER and Asterisk can be used simultaneously
to setup a VoIP solution. We have chosen the deployment
depicted in figure 1 for our testbed. Asterisk monitors and
controls outgoing VoIP traffic and therefore accounting tasks
while SER is responsible for the incoming traffic and load
balancing when necessary. Our choice allows a multitude of
scenarios where our honeyphone will be registered once at
Asterisk and once at SER, and so on.
The honeyphone registers its IP address with a number
of SIP URIs at the registrar sever imbedded in Asterisk or
SER. The SIP URIs of the honeypot may be declared to the
outside world as users of the domain, but because they do not
represent real users they should theoretically never be called.
The honeyphone allows to record and study most of VoIP
attacks. In a user enumeration, while the attacker is trying
to discover the SIP URIs of one domain, it can fall on the
1Asterisk: The Open Source PBX, http://www.asterisk.org
2iptel.org SIP Express Router, http://www.iptel.org/ser/
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Fig. 1. Honeyphone environment
honeyphone address space. This could be a prestep for other
forms of attack such as DoS. Similarly, the honeyphone could
receive SPIT calls.
VoIP fingerprinting is a method used by an attacker to know
the type of implementation of a SIP hardphone or softphone.
In the second step, the attacker tries to exploit known vulner-
abilities of the detected device. In passive fingerprinting, the
attacker looks at the User-Agent header of a SIP message
sent by the fingerprinted device. To deceive the attacker, we
configure each SIP URI of the honeyphone to adopt one SIP
user agent type and send its name in the User-Agent header.
In such a way, we can study the attacks against one particular
type of SIP user agent. Active fingerprinting is much more
complicated [6] and we can not easily deceive the attacker. The
honeyphone has to be implemented using the same stack of the
SIP device desired to be under study. We do not address this
difficulty yet, since active fingerprinting is still in a primary
stage development and attacks still do not tailor the target
device type. The honeyphone could masquerade also as a SIP
proxy to record specific attacks against SIP servers.
Figure 2 reflects the functional scheme of the reception of
an INVITE message by the honeyphone. When Asterisk or
SER receives an INVITE to one of the honeyphone registered
numbers, its location database will indicate the IP address of
the honeyphone. The default behavior of a SIP proxy like SER
is to add itself to the list of Via headers before it forwards the
request, while Asterisk as a back to back user agent deletes
all the Via headers and put itself instead. We prefer not to
change the request when forwarding it and to not play the
role of RTP proxy (in case of Asterisk). We intervene at the
SER or Asterisk level, to configure them properly. We found
that SER is more flexible for such requirements.
V. HONEYPHONE SUITE COMPONENTS
Starting from the tasks expected by the honey-pot, and
admitting the importance of a high flexible and scalable design,
we build our model around five main components as depicted
in figure 3.
• The honey-pot agent: is the core of the honeypot archi-
tecture and the intelligent part of the application. It is
Fig. 2. functional scheme of reception of an INVITE
Fig. 3. Honeyphone architecture
responsible for accepting incoming calls and investigating
possible attacks.
• The protocol stacks(SIP, SDP, RTP): are built based on
the protocol standards, and are responsible for building
and parsing the messages, as well as the transmission and
reception of the packets over the transport layer.
• The honeypot profiles database: contains several config-
uration files and thus allows the administrator to choose
one profile which is suitable to its needs rather than build
it by itself. The benefit of this component is twofold,
first, to set up the honeypot in its environment, and
second, to control its behavior. We strive for application
scalability and dynamism in the way we build up our
profiles. Indeed, profiles in the database could be far
from the honeypot area. They can be bots assessing the
performance or the security of the domain.
• Reconnaissance tools: are used in the investigation pro-
cedure to check the received messages (e.g. service scan-
ning: nmap 3, sip messages crafting: SIPSAK 4, passive
OS finger printing tool: pOf 5).
• The inference engine: is able to interpret automatically
the results of investigation by means of special metrics
and a Bayes model, we have chosen the Bayes model
3Nmap:Network Mapper, http://www.insecure.org/nmap/
4Sipsak: SIP Swiss Army Knife, http://sipsak.org/
5pOf: passive OS fingerprinting tool, http://lcamtuf.coredump.
cx/p0f.shtml
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due to its adaptive capability, scalability and real time
performance. The belief output is on behalf of the domain
administrator. More details are given in section VII.
• The graphical user interface: allows the administrator to
choose and setup a honey-pot profile, as well as visualize
traces, alerts and statistics.
VI. HONEYPHONE AGENT DESCRIPTION
In this section, we explain in more details the honey-pot
agent components starting from the profile specifications and
ending with the interaction with the reconnaissance tools.
A. Profile Configuration
A profile is formed by two independent sets of parameters.
The ”environment” parameters are used to set up the honeypot
in its environment. They look like any soft-phone configuration
parameters and use an attribute:value grammar. They
determine two types of settings:
• host and honey-pot identity settings like for instance the
IP address, protocol ports to be used, and the contact or
list of contacts the honey-pot will register with.
• network dependencies like for instance the registrar
server, the DNS server, SIP proxy and the VoiceMail
server.
The ”behavior” parameters allow to control the honey-
pot behavior. The honey-pot can be in one of two function-
ing modes, either deterministic or randomized. Deterministic
mode is based on fixed settings while randomized mode is
based on mathematical random distributions. Each state of the
state machine is coded in form of a clause:
State1 {
Event1/Operator1[,
Event2/Operator2 ...]
}
To ease the presentation we make a short introduction to
the state machine of a SIP user agent. The used model is
taken from the open source VOCAL project documentation
[7]. The base code provides a class for each state. Each state
has a list of operators. Operators execute themselves at the
entrance of the state, at the exit of the state or as response
to occurred events which cause the machine to pass from
a state to another. The events that drive the state machine
of a SIP user agent are also coded in generic classes. The
most important ones are SipEvent that occurs when a SIP
message is received by the UA and TimerEvent that occurs
when a period of time has elapsed. Our approach is to take the
state machine of a SIP user agent respecting the SIP standard,
and upgrade it by adding or modifying events and operators.
In figure 4 we show a simplified state machine taken from
[7] and how it can be written in our format. For example
Idle{onhook/OpOnHook} means that in the Idle state
the operator OpOnHook will take care of the event onhook.
To represent the operators that execute at the entry and the
exit of a state, we add two keywords : entry is an event
generated when logging in the state, and exit is an event
generated when logging out the state. Let us now take an
example of a honeyphone profile. Assume that we need to set
up the honeyphone to respond automatically after let us say
5 seconds of receiving a call, the Ringing clause has to be
changed as follow:
entry/OpStartRing(5),
ringtimeout/OpAnwerCall
After 5 seconds, the operator OpStartRing generates an
instance of TimerEvent class. ringtimeout will be caught
by the OpAnswerCall operator that drives the machine to
the InCall state. To play back a speech file for 60 seconds
after answering the call, a new line must be added in the
Incall clause. In addition, we can record the conversation:
entry/OpRecord,
entry/OpPlayFile(speech0.mp3, 60)
If 2 operators catch the same event, they execute in parallel
threads.
The advantage of such an approach is that instead of
events initiated by human interaction such as offhook and
ophook, a honeyphone is able to automate these decisions.
The preparatory stage is the process of transforming the
behavior configuration file into a runnable state machine and it
is fully automated. All the operators and events are pre-coded
in appropriate classes and documented so that they can easily
be used. A more friendly way to set up the different behavior
requirements can be through the graphical interface. The GUI
prompts the administrator to fill up a review form and then
provides a suitable file to the preparatory stage.
B. Interaction with the reconnaissance tools
The investigation procedure about a received INVITE mes-
sage is added in the honey-pot machine at the Idle clause as a
INVITE/OpInvestigate statement. In a parallel direction
of the call progress, the operator OpInvestigate will
release the work of the verification tools through the interface
of a specialized library.
The IP addresses and protocol ports that participate in
the session initiation form the list under interrogation. The
concerned pieces of the INVITE message are the domain
part in the From header, Contact and Via headers,
Record-Route and Route if present, and from the SDP
body Connection(c), Owner(o) and Media(m) pa-
rameters. Some of the concerned pieces are underlined in the
typical INVITE in figure 5. For each IP address or host name
in the above cited list, the inquiry procedure aims to evaluate
the following fields:
• WHOIS : ownership and real world information by means
of Internet registries. In the honeyphone database, a
WHOIS trust table assigns for each entry a trust coef-
ficient between 0 and 1.
• Valid DNS : checking of DNS information by means of
DNS, Reverse DNS, DNS SRV [8]or ENUM [9] requests
according to the case;
• AS : the autonomous number where the IP or host resides.
In the honeyphone database, an AS trust table assigns for
each entry a trust coefficient between 0 and 1.
• GL : the geographic location of the IP or host. In the
honeyphone database, a location trust table assigns for
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Mode : Deterministic
Idle {
onhook/OpOnHook,
INVITE/OpRing,
offhook/OpStarDialing
}
Ringing {
reINVITE/OpRingingInvite,
onhook/OpCwRing,
timeout/OpRingCancel,
offhook/OpAnswerCall
Dialing {
onhook/OpOnHook,
DTMF/OpAddDigit,
dialcomplete/OpInviteUrl,
}
Trying{
180/OpStartRingBackTone,
30x/OpReDirect,
onhook/OpEndCall,
200/OpFarEndAnswered,
}
Incall{
onhook/OpTerminateCall,
BYE/OpEndCall,
DTMF/OpFwdDigit,
INVITE/opReinvite,
flash/OpstartCallWaiting,
}
Calling Error{
onhook/OpOnHook,
}
Fig. 4. Behavior configuration of a simplified SIP UA state machine
To respond to question 1:
• check if i a m registered with the SIP URI: Bob
To respond to question 2 :
• send OPTIONS request to 130.200.10.11:5060
• if the response is OK so some SIP stack is running there
• check for some DNS SRV record in the DNS server
To respond to question 3 :
• hard to answer
• check if all the participating servers do not allow changing of the
caller-ID
To respond to question 4 :
• check if the server belongs to the Via chain
• evaluate a trust in the server
To respond to question 5:
• check if 130.200.10.11 corresponds to uni.pole-nord.fr in the Contact
header using DNS or Reverse DNS requests
To respond to question 6 :
• send UDP packet to 130.200.10.11:49170
• if no ICMP Destination Unreachable response is received so the port is
open
Fig. 5. Typical INVITE message
each city a trust coefficient between 0 and 1.
• Has Port : if a port (SIP or RTP) proclaimed to be
open is really open;
• Fingerprint : normally found in the User-Agent
header, however we can actively fingerprint the caller
device by sequence of OPTIONS requests as proposed
in [6]. A fingerprint trust table assigns for each device a
trust coefficient between 0 and 1;
• Historical cache: check in if and how frequently
the IP or host is seen by the honeyphone. The maximum
frequency is 1 and is reached if the IP or host was seen 10
times or more. An aging threat decreases the frequency
and can delete the entry if it was not seen for a long time.
In addition, the inquiry procedure makes IP trace routes
starting from the honeypot and arriving to the different hosts
and proxies mentionned in the INVITE. The outputs of the
inquiry procedure are brought towards the inference engine.
VII. THE INFERENCE ENGINE OF THE HONEYPHONE
The mere fact of receiving a message at the honey-pot is
subject of suspicion. In the same time, it could be the result
of unintentional error from an innocent user. Our approach is
not restricted to messages received by the honeyphone but we
aim at a larger scope to distinguish between normal messages
and rogue messages. Rogue messages are those produced by
crafting tools where some SIP headers are spoofed but are
also those normally built up but forming part of VoIP specified
attacks such as SPIT, user enumeration or DoS.
The interpretation of the results issued by the network-
based investigation functionalities could be assigned to a
human operator who ranks an incoming message and notices
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if something goes wrong. Nevertheless we choose to release
the operator from this task and provide our honeyphone with
an artificial intelligence engine. The networks of plausible
inference proved high efficiency to materialize the human
reasoning by a probabilistic formalism. For example, if a
message arrives at the honeyphone which is publicly unknown,
there is a high prior probability for a suspicious hypothesis.
We give a brief introduction about the Bayes inference rules
and then we present our detection model.
A. Introduction to the Bayes inference
Bayesian methods provide a formalism for reasoning about
partial belief under conditions of uncertainty [10]. They are
based on the empirically verifiable relationship between pos-
terior (the belief we accord a hypothesis H upon obtaining
evidence e) and prior (P(H)) probabilities:
P (H/e) =
P (e/H)P (H)
P (e)
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph whose arrows
represent causal influences and each of its nodes represents
certain knowledge. Bayesian trees are a subset of bayesian
networks. In a Bayesian tree, each node might have several
children and one parent. The propagation and fusion of the
belief in a Bayesian tree are proceeded under the following
rules:
• The likelihood (or diagnostic) messages λ are travelling
upward the tree.
• The prior (or causal) messages π are travelling downward
the tree.
• A child is linked to its parent by a conditional probability
table (CPT) of which the elements are given by:
CPTij = P (child = j/parent = i)
Each row of the matrix is a discrete distribution over the
child node states giving the parent node state and thus it
sums to 1.
• The propagation of the prior messages is given by:
πchild = απparent • CPT (child/parent) (1)
where π is a row vector and α is a constant to normalize
the distribution.
• The propagation of the likelihood messages is given by:
λto parentchild = CPT (child/parent) • λchild (2)
where λ is a column vector.
• The likelihood messages are fused together by an ele-
mentwise multiplication:
Lparent(i) =
∏
child∈children(parent)
λto parentchild (i) (3)
λparent is obtained by normalizing the vector Lparent to
the unit sum.
• Finally, the belief over the states at a node is obtained by
an elementwise multiplication of λparent and πparent and
then normalizing the resulting vector by an appropriate
constant β:
BEL(i) = βπ(i)λ(i) (4)
B. Bayes model to detect crafted and suspicious messages
We propose the model in figure 6. We are interested in three
hypothesis at the root node:
• Crafted: where the incoming request is proved to be
built up by an attack tool and some hosts and ports are
verified to be not as claimed,
• Suspicious: where the hosts and ports are positively
verified, but the request is part of a traffic attack such as
SPIT, and
• Normal: where everything looks good and the request
is just about a user fault.
The Bayes model can learn new hypothesis and we may have
different degrees of suspicion or craftiness. We are satisfied
with these three hypothesis in our first prototype. The leaf
nodes are observable evidences drawn directly or in function of
the investigation responses. The variables at the leaf nodes are
assumed to be conditionally independent. The new variables
are defined as follow:
• To: The first thing that we do when we receive a message
is to check up if it is really sent for us. The honeyphone
checks if the SIP URI in the To header is one of the
SIP URIs that it is registered with at the registrar server.
Under the Normal hypothesis, where receiving a message
is due to a routing fault or a user fault, we assume that
To will be false. Note that this reasoning is valid from
the honeypot perspective, if the inference engine works
with a user phone or group of phones, it is normal to
receive messages with the right To header.
• Dispersion of source points: Let us take the
honeyphone as reference and name it O. We consider
also the signaling source (the host in the first Via header)
as point A, the host in the Contact header as point B,
the mediating source (i.e. the host in the Connection
parameter) as point C , the host in the Owner parameter
as point D, and the host returned by the location of
the SIP URI in the From header as point E. For each
of the 5 mentionned points, we measure the number of
IP hops separating it from the honeyphone by means
of traceroutes. Our traceroute consists of a sequence
of OPTION requests with increased TTL IP header (A
SIP layer traceroute is also possible using a sequence
of OPTION requests with increased Max-Forwards
SIP header). We have chosen the number of IP hops
as a metric because it is more accurate than geographic
location or AS number. Typically, the 5 mentionned
points are very close and have to be at an equal number
of hops from the honeyphone. A dispersed distribution of
them reinforces the Crafted and Suspicious hypothesis.
We adopt the dispersion of source points as the standard
deviation of their number of hops:
σsources =
√
E(X2) − (E(X))2
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Where X is the discrete variable representing the number
of hops of the 5 points and E is the expectation function.
• Trust: The trust on a message is composed of the trust
in its source and the different proxies involved in its
routing. As depicted in the figure 6, the trust variable is
induced from its child nodes which are directly observed
in the investigation results. The overall trust of the source
and the proxies is calculated over multiple steps. In each
step, we present the values of the pointed host and we
release the inference work. A discrete Markov chain helps
us to summarize the trust as steps proceed. This chain
is designed to memorize a high degree of distrust if one
proxy is declared to be distrusted, and to balance between
different trust hypothesis otherwise.
C. Unrolling of a scenario
To clarify our approach, let us assume the following situa-
tion:
1) The INVITE message mentionned in figure 5 is received
at the honeypot.
2) The request is totally correct, it is not crafted or part of
an attack.
3) The honeypot was not registered with the SIP URI found
in the To header.
4) The cause of receiving this invite is a configuration error
at the registrar server.
We are interested in this scenario to show how the honeyphone
will work upon receiving the message until concluding that it
is kind of Normal behavior. We do not show all the calculation
details but we just give an indication of the approach. Firstly,
let us show in the next table the interesting headers and their
values:
Header Value
From Alice@pole-nord.fr
Contact Alice@uni.pole-nord.fr
Via 0 130.200.10.11:5060
Via 1 130.200.10.20:5060
Via 2 152.81.144.22:5060
Record-Route 152.81.144.22
Connection 130.200.10.11:49170
Owner 130.200.10.11
The table contains 3 IP addresses, one domain name and one
host name. The results of the inquiry procedure are shown in
the table I. To infer the trust on the list, we take its members
one after the other. We present the likelihood messages at the
leaf nodes of the sub tree corresponding to the root Trust,
and we present the prior message at the root Trust. The
likelihood messages come from the investigation results and
the prior messages come from the Markov Chain. The CPT
matrices are already fixed based on logical semantics and
simulation adjustments. The field of each observable is divided
in multiple intervals. In this unrolling, we use a small number
of intervals for simplicity reasons. For the same reasons,
only two hypothesis stand at the Trust node: T(trusted) and
D(distrusted). Let ”uni.pole-nord.fr” or shortly ”uni” be the
first member to process and take it as an example. The CPT
matrix that relies between Trust and Historical nodes is:
CPT (Historical/Trust) =
0 [1 − 2] [3− ∝]
T 0.9 0.1 0.0
D 0.1 0.2 0.7
”uni” is never seen before, the likelihood message is:
λHistorical
0
[1 − 2]
[3 −∞]
=

 10
0


The likelihood at the parent node is obtained from equation
(2):
λto parentHistorical
T
D
=
(
0.9
0.1
)
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TABLE I
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION FOR THE INVITE MESSAGE
pole-nord.fr uni.pole-nord.fr 130.200.10.11 130.200.10.20 152.81.144.22
Frequency
(Historical)
0 (not seen before) 0 0 0 0
WHOIS Universite
Pole nord
Universite
Pole nord
Universite
Pole nord
Universite
Pole nord
LORIA-INRIA
AS - 1200 1200 1200 1100
G.L. Toulouse Toulouse Toulouse Toulouse Nancy
Are ports
opened ?
- yes yes yes yes
SIP F.P. - Kphone Kphone SER SER
DNS true 147.210.9.155 uni.pole-nord.fr proxy.pole-nord.fr proxy.loria.fr
Similarly the other likelihood messages are initiated and
calculated. The next step is to fuse them using equation(3)
and normalize the result:
λTrust
T
D
=
(
0.91
0.09
)
The prior vector is initiated by equal probabilities for T and
D. The belief is calculated using equation (4):
BelTrust
T
D
=
(
0.91
0.09
)
The result is taken as post-belief and will be used to calculate
the pre-belief for the subsequent inference:
PRE BELk = POST BELk−1M
The matrix M defines a Markov chain that translates the fact
that a list tends to be distrustable if one of its member tends
to be distrustable:
M =
T D
T 0.60 0.40
D 0.10 0.90
The pre-belief is not different than the prior probability
vector which will be used in the calculus of the subsequent
member in the list.
At the end of the five inferences, we obtain the trust over
the list:
λTrust
T
D
=
(
0.95
0.05
)
The message seems to be trustable which indicates a Normal
behavior hypothesis. Now we have to present the likelihood
messages at the other children of the Nature node. The To
header does not correspond to any of the URIs the honeyphone
is registered with:
λTo
Y es
No
=
(
0
1
)
Fig. 7. SIP Vs. IP routes of the INVITE
The CPT matrix is already set to :
CPT (To/Nature) =
Y es No
Normal 0 1
Suspicious 0.5 0.5
Crafted 0.5 0.5
After normalizing the likelihood at the parent is:
λto parentTo
N
S
C
=

 0.50.25
0.25


In our case, the 5 locations representing the source points are
overcome. The dispersion is null (σsources=0) which indicates
a Normal behavior hypothesis. The next step is to fuse all the
likelihood messages at the Nature node using equation (3):
λNature
N
S
C
=

 0.90.05
0.05


The prior vector is set to give more weight to the Suspicious
and Crafted hypothesis regarding the nature of the honeyphone
deployment.
πNature =
(
0.3 0.4 0.4
)
Finally, our model produces the belief about the INVITE
request basing on both prior and likelihood using equation
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(4):
BelNature
N
S
C
=

 0.880.06
0.06


The honeyphone concludes that the message is far from being
a kind of naive (Crafted) or advanced (Suspicious) attacks, and
that it is received by error (Normal). The SIP route formed
by the succession of proxies, and the IP route traced back
from the honeypot to the source are depicted in figure 7. A
graphical interface provides the system administrator with such
geographical view so he can detect abnormal routing situations
(e.g.: proxies are abnormally distributed with respect to the IP
or geographical routes). Automating this process is the subject
of future works intention.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
Many approaches to protect the emergent VoIP applications
have been proposed in the research community. VoIP back-
ground, threats explanation and practical recommendations to
configure properly, validate and monitor the security infras-
tructure are subject of recently published books as in [11].
Dynamic firewall design for IP telephony environments is
evaluated and improved in [12]. Suitable intrusion detection
and prevention architectures are proposed with prototype im-
plementations as in [13].The authors of [4] present a threat
model of the integrated signaling between PSTN and IP
networks and propose a global solution to secure the gateways.
Our approach is new with respect to the previous works
because it adds another layer of defense by using honeypots.
Installing a honeypot allows to log and study attack traces
and discover hackers methodologies ([14]). Our approach is
also based on high reactivity properties of reconnaissance
and investigation. We respond to the importance of inserting
artificial intelligence in the analysis of data and the deduction
of hypothesis. The theoretical background of our inference
engine is inspired from [10]. Bayesian networks demonstrated
real time feasibility and low fault rates when they were used
in intrusion detection systems [15].
IX. IMPLEMENTATION AND FUTURE WORKS
The honeyphone software is partially implemented around
the open source code of [7]. We hope to have the complete
architecture integrated in the software to be inserted and tested
in the VoIP test bed of the EMANICS6 European project
soon. Human users communicating across the project by a
large set of IP phones will use different VoIP protocols and
implementations which provide us with the necessary traces
needed in the learning stage of the classifier. In addition,
we are designing normal user bots according to normal user
behavior in the PSTN telephony system to be launched in the
test bed. In parallel, we are coding prototypes of VoIP attacks
and SPIT bots to insert malicious attacks so the correctness
of the classifier can be tested and re-adjusted. While the real
time performance of the honeyphone to gather and deal with
6www.emanics.org
relevant informations about the attacker was considered from
the beginning, optimizing this performance to put suitable
decisions in action within the time constraints is matter of
an extended study in the future.
X. CONCLUSION
We presented in this paper an innovative approach to design
a VoIP specific honeypot. The honeyphone is supplied by an
application program interface which controls a rich set of
network tools. Rather than receiving and dumping SIP packets
to be studying as attack traces, the honeyphone is able to
gather information in real time about the received messages.
An important component in our architecture is the inference
engine which can differ between a routing fault, a shooted
crafted message and a distrustable call. Simulation unrolling
of examples showed promising results about the effectiveness
of the information gathering tools and the correctness of the
inference engine deductions.
REFERENCES
[1] F. Pouget and M. Dacier, “Honeypot-based forensics,” in AusCERT2004,
AusCERT Asia Pacific Information technology Security Conference
2004, 23rd - 27th May 2004, Brisbane, Australia, May 2004.
[2] VoIPSA, “Voip security and privacy threat taxonomy,” Public
Realease 1.0, Oct 2005, http://www.voipsa.org/Activities/VOIPSA
Threat Taxonomy 0.1.pdf.
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